Available empirical evidence suggests that skewness preference plays an important role in understanding asset pricing and gambling. This paper establishes a skewness-comparability condition on probability distributions that is necessary and sufficient for any decision maker's preferences over the distributions to depend on their means, variances and, third moments only.
comparability condition. The preferences of Expected Utility maximizing decision makers over skewness-comparable distributions as defined by these authors, on the other hand, have not been explored and characterized. This paper establishes a skewness-comparability condition on probability distributions that is necessary and sufficient for any decision maker's preferences over the distributions to depend on their means, variances and, third moments only. Under the condition, a EU maximizer's preferences for a larger mean, smaller variance, and a larger third moment are shown to parallel respectively his preferences for a first-degree stochastic dominant improvement, a mean-preserving contract, and a downside risk decrease and are characterized in terms of the VNM utility function in exactly the same way. The condition generalizes not just the skewness-comparability conditions proposed by Van Zwet (1964) and Oja (1981) but also the condition for two distributions to be comparable in terms of downside risk defined by Menezes et. al. (1980) . Furthermore, distributions satisfying the "location-scale" or "linear class" condition of Meyer (1987) and Sinn (1983) , which they show to be sufficient for the consistency between the mean-variance analysis and expected utility maximization, are shown to be skewness comparable distributions with identical standardized third moments. As such, our definitions and results permit a rigorous evaluation of the available empirical evidence on skewness preference in the contexts of gambling and asset pricing. By showing that all Bernoulli distributions are mutually skewness comparable, we further show that in the wide range of economic models where these distributions are used individuals' decisions under risk can be understood as tradeoffs between mean, variance, and skewness. Our basic characterizations also immediately imply that a concave transformation of a random variable reduces the skewness of the distribution and hence, other things being equal, the attractiveness of the distribution to a skewness-preferring decision maker. An application of this general regularity addresses the issue of whether a progressive tax reform reduces the incentive to take risks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out the basic definitions and main results on skewness comparability. Section 3 establishes the skewness comparability of the widely used Bernoulli distributions and examines its implications. Section 4 concludes with discussions on the comparison with the existing approach to modelling skewness preference, the implications for asset pricing and the decision to gamble, and the effects of progressive tax reforms on risk-taking.
Skewness Comparability and Expected Utility Maximization

Preliminaries and Stochastic Dominance
Throughout the paper, (cumulative) distribution functions, denoted by F (x), G(x), etc., have the supports of their densities contained in [a, b] . We denote the mean, the variance, and the standardized and the unstandardized third central moments of a distribution F (x) by μ F , σ 2 F , m 3 F , andm 3 F respectively. That is,
For reasons that will become clear, when the abbreviated term "the third moment" is used in what follows, it refers exclusively to the standardized third central moment, never the unstandardized one. VNM utility functions are denoted by u, v, etc.
For a distribution function F (x), define F (1) (x) = F (x) and
a F (n) (y)dy for all x ∈ [a, b] and all n ∈ {1, 2, . . .}.
The standard notion of nth-degree stochastic dominance is defined as follows.
Definition 1
The change from F (x) to G(x) is an nth-degree stochastic dominant improvement a, b] where the inequality is strict for some subinterval(s).
We will henceforth use [F (x) → G(x)] as a shorthand for the change of distributions from F (x) to G(x). It is well-known that notions of a mean-preserving spread (contraction) and a downside risk increase (decrease) can be defined as special cases of stochastic dominant deterioration (improvement).
Definition 2 (i) An second-degree stochastic dominant deterioration (improvement) is a mean-
(ii) A third-degree stochastic dominant deterioration (improvement) is a downside risk increase
The definitions of an MPS and a downside risk increase here are of course equivalent to those in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) and Menezes et. al. (1980) respectively. In particular, [
is a downside risk increase if and only if it satisfies the integral conditions: (i)
for all x where the inequality is strict for some subinterval(s) of [a, b] . Menezes et. al. (1980) show that
They further show the following.
Lemma 1 (Menezes et. al.) [G(x) → F (x)] being a downside risk increase implies, but is not
The better known result of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) on the other hand establishes that
Skewness Comparability
Van Zwet (1964) defines that a distribution F is more skewed to the right than G if R(x) ≡ F −1 (G(x)) is convex 3 and it has become widely accepted that a good skewness measure should preserve the skewness ordering so defined (see for example Oja (1981) and Arnold and Groeneveld (1995) ). Following Oja (1981), we define strong skewness comparability as follows.
Definition 3
(i) Distributions F and G are strongly skewness comparable if F −1 (G(x)) is convex or concave.
(ii) F is more skewed to the right than G in the sense of Van Zwet if F −1 (G(x)) is convex.
3 Letting F and G be the distribution functions for random variablesx andỹ respectively, F −1 (G(x)) being convex is equivalent tox (or F −1 ( )) being a convex transformation ofỹ (or G −1 ( )). As explained intuitively by Van Zwet (1964, p.9) , a "convex transformation of a random variable effects a contraction of the lower part of the scale of measurement and an extension of the upper part."
The condition for skewness comparability is however too strong and may not be strictly satisfied in many typical cases where one distribution is considered more skewed than another such as distributions F and G and their respective density functions f and g illustrated in Figures 1 and 2. f g Figure 1 : The density functions f and g. We observe in Figures 1 and 2 that if two distributions have the same mean and, loosely speaking, the same "spread" as depicted, then one distribution being more skewed to the right typically implies the two distribution functions cross twice. However, in cases such as depicted, F −1 may or may not be an exact convex transformation of G −1 as is required by Van Zwet's definition.
Noting that if F (x) is the distribution function for a random variablex, then
the distribution for the standardized random variable (x − μ F )/σ F , we state Oja's (1981) weaker comparability condition as follows.
Definition 4
(i) Distributions F and G are skewness comparable in the sense of Oja if
(ii) F is more skewed to the right than G in the sense of Oja if
exactly twice first from above.
The following lemma confirms that this is a weaker notion of skewness comparability and relates it to the concept of increasing downside risk of Menezes et. al. (1980). 4 Lemma 2 (i) If F and G are strongly skewness comparable, then they are skewness comparable in the sense of Oja.
(ii) If F is more skewed to the right than G in the sense of Oja, then
is a downside risk increase.
In view of Lemma 2, we define our notion of "generalized skewness comparability" based on the notion of a downside risk increase and show that this is a necessary and sufficient condition for preferences over two distributions to be determined by their means, variances, and third moments alone. For expositional ease, we henceforth simply use "skewness comparability" to mean "generalized skewness comparability".
Definition 5
is a downside risk increase or a downside risk decrease or
(ii) F is more skewed to the right than The result clearly shows that any decision maker's preferences over skewness comparable distributions are determined by the first three moments of the distributions. We, however, restrict our attention to Expected Utility theory because it remains the only widely used decision model known to be consistent with downside risk aversion. 6 The result implies, in particular, that for
Proofs of all formal results not immediate from existing results are given in Appendix B. 5 It should be noted that the concept of skewness comparability is distinct from that of third-degree stochastic dominance. Simple examples can be constructed to show that two distributions being skewness comparable neither implies nor is implied by one of the distributions third-degree stochastically dominating the other. 6 Chateauneuf et. al. (2002) show that in the widely used Rank-Dedependent Expected theory, which generalizes EU theory, downside risk aversion implies EU maximization.
function from R × R + × R to R. We next show that for skewness comparable distributions, an EU maximizer's preferences for a larger mean, a smaller variance, and a larger third moment parallel respectively his preferences for a FSD improvement, an MPC, and a downside risk decrease and are characterized in terms of the VNM utility function in exactly the same way.
Theorem 2
any two skewness comparable distributions F and G if and only if u 000 (x) > 0 for all x.
(ii) Supposing μ F = μ G and m 3
any two skewness comparable distributions F and G if and only if u 00 (x) < 0 for all x.
any two skewness comparable distributions F and G if and only if u 0 (x) > 0 for all x.
Or equivalently,
is increasing in μ F and m 3 F and decreasing in σ 2 F for skewness-comparable changes in any distribution F if and only if u 0 (x) > 0, u 00 (x) < 0, and
With standard results in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) and Menezes et. al. (1980) , the result is implied by the following lemma, which may be of independent interest.
Lemma 3 Suppose F and G are (generalized) skewness comparable. Then (i) m 3 F > m 3 G if and only if F is more skewed to the right than G.
For any two skewness comparable distributions F and G, we can thus have a simple and useful decomposition of the difference in expected utility as follows.
where Sinn (1983) and Meyer (1987) define that two distributions F and G are in the "linear class"
or the "location-scale" model if F (x) = G(βx + α) with β > 0 and show that EU maximizers' preferences over distributions in this model are determined by the means and variances of the distributions only, i.e., mean-variance decision models are consistent with EU maximization. Meyer (1987) further shows that in many important economic models, including Sandmo's (1971) model of competitive firms facing random output price and Tobin's (1958) theory of liquidity preference with a single risky and riskless asset, comparative statics analysis can be reformulated as choice among distributions in this class. Clearly, if F and G are in the "location-scale" model,
That is, distributions in the "location-scale" model are skewness-comparable ones with identical third moments.
3 Skewness of the Bernoulli Distributions
Skewness comparability of the Bernoulli Distributions
Their simple parametric structure notwithstanding, the Bernoulli distributions are applicable to a wide range of economic problems and are used in a wide range of economic models. We show that the answer to the question of skewness comparability for this simple but important family of distributions is very clearcut. Let [(y, p)(z, 1 − p)] denote a Bernoulli distribution that gives y with probability p and z with probability (1 − p).
Proposition 1 For i = 1, 2, let F i (x), μ i and σ i be the cumulative distribution function, the mean 7 Chiu (2005a) shows that, if Van Zwet's stronger notion of increasing skewness is used, the function −
, or the "prudence measure" as defined by Kimball (1990) , has the interpretation of measuring the strength of u's skewness preference relative to his risk aversion, and thus determines an individual's tradeoff between risk and skewness. An exposition on the general relationship between skewness preference and the prudence measure is given in Appendix A.
and the standard deviation of [(y i , p i )(z i , 1 − p i )] respectively, and y i < z i . Then (i) p 1 < p 2 if and only if F 2 (x) is more skewed to the right than F 1 (x).
(ii) p 1 = p 2 if and only if
The result clearly shows that not only are all Bernoulli distributions skewness comparable but also their degrees of skewness are determined by the parameter p alone. This gives a novel perspective on individuals' decisions in the wide range of economic models where the choices available are assumed to be Bernoulli distributions: These decisions can be understood as tradeoffs between mean, variance, and skewness. We will illustrate in what follows the usefulness of this perspective in understanding individuals' betting behavior and self-protection decisions. The same approach can potentially yield interesting insights in such important models as those of auctions, tournaments, among others. Moreover, the result also shows that if two Bernoulli distributions share the same value for the parameter p, they are not just skewness comparable but also in the "location-scale model" or "linear class" and hence are consistent with mean-variance preferences.
Empirical Evidence for Gamblers' Skewness Preference
The result that any pair of Bernoulli distributions are skewness comparable indicates that the empirical findings of Golec and Tamarkin (1998) and Garret and Sobel (1999) do represent evidence for gamblers' skewness preference as is defined and characterized in this paper. Specifically, a bet on horse h considered by Golec and Tamarkin (1998) (and Ali (1977) 
, where X h denotes the return of a winning bet on horse h and a losing bet returns zero to the bettor, and assuming bettors have identical utility function u( ), their expected utility betting on horse h is
Assuming that u(0) = 0 and u(X H ) = 1, where H represents the highest-odds horse, and that the amount bet on each horse is such that bettors are indifferent between bets on any horse h, for any h, we have
which gives p H /p h = u(X h ). Racetrack data are then used to estimate the utility function assumed to take the cubic form u( Ali (1977) . More importantly, a utility function with u 000 ( ) > 0 estimated using a data set of skewness-comparable distributions with different degrees of skewness does indicate (global) skewness preference as defined in this paper. 8 Using data from U.S. state lotteries, Garret and Sobel (1999) follow the exact same methodology by assuming that lottery players completely disregard the prizes of a lottery other than the top prize (i.e., winning anything other than the top prize of a lottery gives zero utility) and hence a choice among state lotteries is effectively a choice among Bernoulli distributions. They obtain identical results in terms of the characteristics of the utility function. That is, to the extent that lottery players do play only to win the top prize, 9 the state lottery data also support global skewness preference.
Self-Protection
Ehrlich and Becker (1972) define self-protection to be the expenditure on reducing the probability of suffering a loss and highlight its conceptual distinction from self-insurance, which is the expenditure 8 That is, since individuals' preferences over these distributions are determined by their means, variances, and degrees of skewness alone, if individuals were averse or indifferent to skewness, the estimates of b 3 should have been negative or close to zero. Cain and Peel (2004) point out that for the class of Bernoulli distributions of the form [(0, 1 − p h )(X h , p h )] (with one of the possible outcomes fixed at 0), the mean and the variance of a distribution determine its unstandardized and standardized third moments. It is therefore not sensible to claim, as did Golec and Tamarkin (1998) , that bettors "trade off negative expected return and variance for positive skewness". Nevertheless Proposition 1 implies that Bernoulli distributions of this form do have different degrees of skewness as determined by the value of p h . That is, the data sets used in these empirical studies consist of distributions with different means, variances, and degrees of skewness only that there is an implicit restriction on their relationship that leaves only 2 degrees of freedom. A utility function with u 000 ( ) > 0 estimated using such data sets still does represent evidence for skewness preference as defined in this paper.
9 This may explain why Walker and Young (2001) , equating skewness to the unstandardized third moment, find that, while lottery sales depend positively on the skewness of the prize distribution, the estimate for skewness preference is not as significant as Garret and Sobel (1999) : they simply regress ticket sales on the (unstandardized) third moment considering prizes other than the top prize. Clearly lotteries with multiple prizes may or may not be skewness comparable. If the distributions are not all mutually skewness-comparable, then a skewness-preferring individual (i.e., an individual whose utility function has a positive third derivative) may not exhibit a consistent preference for a larger third moment, resulting in an empirically less pronounced effect of the third moment on ticket sales. This hypothesis can be tested by excluding the non-skewness-comparable distributions from the data set, which, our results predict, will improve the significance of the effect of the third moment if players are skewness-lovers.
on reducing the severity of loss. 10 Denoting the initial wealth by w and the probability of suffering a loss l by p, self-protection is the expenditure on reducing the probability p of the Bernoulli distribution [(w − l, p)(w, 1 − p)]. Proposition 1 shows that a reduction in p implies a reduction in (positive) skewness and an EU maximizer's preferences regarding self-protection are completely determined by its effects on the mean, variance, and third moment. Let F and G denote respectively the distributions before and after a reduction in p by , we can explicitly decompose the effect of self-protection as follows:
where
This gives a novel and definitive characterization of all the relevant factors determining the choice of self-protection and brings together, and offers straightforward interpretations to, results from recent attempts to relate selfprotection to skewness preference (i.e., the third derivative of a VNM utility function). 11 For example, if the individual pays the fair price l for the reduction in p, then clearly
It follows that he is willing to pay more than the fair price for the reduction in loss probability if
More specifically, the change in variance caused by a reduction in p by is
If p > 1/2, a risk-averse skewness-preferring individual will not be willing to pay the fair price for a small reduction in p, i.e., for ≤ (2p − 1). On the other hand, if p ≤ 1/2, self-protection reduces 10 In particular, unlike self-insurance, self-protection may be attractive to both risk averters and risk lovers, and market insurance and self-protection can be complements. Examples of self-protection includes crime prevention measures such as the purchase of burglary alarms, paying a higher price for a safer car or healthier food or a house in a less crime-prone area, the purchase of fire prevention equipments such as smoke detectors, etc. The problem of self-protection is also embedded in the usual moral hazard models and in models of enviromental protection.
11 Until recently, the literature on self-protection focuses primarily on the effect of risk aversion. Briys and Schlesinger (1990) first suggest a link between self-protection and downside risk aversion. Chiu (2000) shows that a risk-averse individual is willing to pay more than the fair price for self-protection if the initial loss probability p is below a threshold, which is less than 1/2 if and only if u 000 > 0 and is lower if −u 000 /u 00 is larger. Eeckhoudt and Gollier (2005) obtain results suggesting that the spending on self-protection is less if u 000 > 0 than if u 000 < 0. Chiu (2005b) shows that if marginal changes in self-protection expenditure are mean-preserving, a larger −u 000 /u 00 implies a lower spending on self-protection.
The precise role played by the change in variance in self-protection decisions has never been recognized.
both the skewness and variance and consequently
Whether a risk-averse skewness-preferring individual is willing to pay more than the fair price for self-protection depends on the strength of his skewness preference relative to his risk aversion, which, as is shown in Appendix A, is measured by −u 000 (x)/u 00 (x). The simple decomposition in (3) thus not only offers much more straightforward interpretations for the results in Chiu (2000 Chiu ( , 2005b and Eeckhoudt and Gollier (2005) but also suggests that the problem of self-protection can be analyzed without using the first-order approach, which entails assuming the second-order condition and its implied restrictions on the relationship between the self-protection expenditure and the reduction in the loss probability. 12
Comparison with the Existing Approach and Implications for
Gambling, Asset Pricing, and Tax Reforms
The Existing Approach to Skewness Preference
The theoretical justification for considering skewness preference has so far been a Taylor series approximation of the expected utility. Specifically, letting F be the distribution function for random variablex,
Clearly if we have a cubic utility function u(x) = c 0 + c 1 x + c 2 x 2 + c 3 x 3 , the cubic expansion will be precise and the expected utility given F can be explicitly calculated as
12 For examle, it may be the case that the initial p is larger than 1/2 and the cost of reducing it by a small amount is larger than l, and yet for a larger reduction in p (through the purchase of more expensive devices), i.e., for large, the total cost is less than l. Then (3) clearly indicates that it is not optimal to choose a small reduction in p but it may be optimal to choose a large reduction. Such possibilities are ruled out in using the first-order approach which requires that the cost of self-protection is a continuous and differentiable function of the reduction in loss probability and such a function is usually further assumed to be convex to guarantee the second-order condition.
That is, if either the Taylor series represents a good approximation or the utility is cubic, u 000 (x) > 0 appears to imply a preference for the unstandardized third central momentm 3 F . 13 On the one hand, our results in the previous section can be seen as confirming that the expected utility given a distribution can be written as a function of its mean, variance, and unstandardized third moment for mutually skewness comparable distributions: since we have shown that a function
is well-defined for skewness comparable changes in F , for such changes we can definê
On the other hand, what (4), (5), and (6) all say is that, assuming u 000 (x) > 0, a largerm 3 F implies a larger Eu(x) if μ F and σ 2 F are held constant. For two distributions F and G with σ 2 F > σ 2 G , in particular,m 3 F >m 3 G does not imply either that F is more skewed than G or that skewness plays any role in determining their comparative desirability to an individual. This seems to be an insight well-hidden in using the traditional approach, as is exemplified by Tsiang's (1972, p.363 
Skewness Preference and the Decision to Gamble
Skewness preference has been associated with gambling since long before the work of Golec and Tamarkin (1998) and Garrett and Sobel (1999) . Markowitz (1952a) suggests that "the third moment of the probability distribution of returns from the portfolio may be connected with a propensity to gamble" and that if individuals' utility of a probability distribution is a function of the third moment as well as the mean and variance of the distribution, then some fair bets would be accepted.
13 This perhaps explains why the unstandardized third moment has been treated synonymously with skewness in the economics and finance literature though as is pointed out in Arditti's (1967, p.20) pioneering analysis of skewness preference, the term skewness is usually saved for the standardized third moment in the statistics literature.
14 Numerous authors have published comments on Tsiang's (1972) paper but none seemed aware of this particular flaw in his argument. See the June 1974 issue of the American Economic Review. Since the two Bernoulli distributions constructed in Borch's (1969) celebrated example share a common probability parameter value, Proposition 1 in the last section indicates that they are consistent with mean-variance preferences. Any attempt to explain the Borch paradox by invoking skewness preference is thus clearly misguided.
variances, as is usually assumed in the context of mean-variance analysis, to accept an independent fair gamble given a sufficiently strong skewness preference? The Taylor approximation in (4) gives the impression that this is possible. To examine the possibility, suppose an individual with initial wealth distribution F is contemplating taking fair gambles that increase the skewness of F in the sense defined in this paper and are independent of F . Then
is well-defined. Consider first the case where U (μ F , σ 2 F , m 3 F ) is decreasing in σ 2 F and increasing in m 3 F for all distribution F . Theorem 2a clearly indicates that U (μ F , σ 2 F , m 3 F ) being decreasing in σ 2 F for all distribution F is equivalent to risk aversion (i.e., u 00 (x) < 0 for all x) and since accepting a fair gamble independent of his initial wealth induces a mean-preserving spread, by the classic result of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) , it always reduces his expected utility given his risk aversion whatever the strength of his skewness preference. Alternatively, assume that for all distribution F ,Û (μ F , σ 2 F ,m 3 F ) is decreasing in σ 2 F and increasing inm 3 F , i.e, (assuming differentiability)
simple differentiation shows that
In other words, with a 3-moment utility function, whether the utility is defined on the standardized or unstandardized third moment, aversion to larger variances implies risk aversion and precludes taking fair gambles whatever the strength of the skewness preference.
Evidence for Skewness Preference in a Three-Moment Capital Asset Pricing Model
Our 3-moment utility function gives a 3-moment capital asset pricing model (CAPM) similar to those of Rubinstein (1973) and Kraus and Litzenberger (1976) without assuming a cubic utility function, 16 which indicates that existing empirical results from studies of asset pricing can be interpreted as evidence for skewness preference as defined in this paper. Specifically let w 0 be an investor's initial wealth, R i the return (i.e., unity plus the rate of return) of the ith risky asset and R i its mean, R F the return of the riskless asset, q i and q F his holdings of the ith risky asset and the riskless asset respectively. Then his final wealth w equals
and unstandardized third moment are
We then have
Form a Lagrangian for maximizing the investor's expected utility subject to a budget constraint.
Taking and rearranging the first-order conditions, we havē
Then denoting by R M the return of the market portfolio of risky assets and invoking an assumption leading to "two-fund separation", 17 the individual's final wealth w can be related to R M by 16 Rubinstein (1973) assumes a cubic utility function while Kraus and Litzenberger (1976) use a utility function of the first 3 moments justified by a Taylor series approximation of the expected utility.
17 Cass and Stiglitz (1970) show that a necessary and sufficient condition for two-fund separation without restriction w = αR M + (w 0 − α)R F for some positive constant α. We can thus writē
and θ 1 and θ 2 are functions of the marginal rates of substitution
. Implicitly assuming all portfolio changes are skewness-comparable in using the 3-moment utility function, coskw(R i , R M ) measures an asset's marginal contribution to the overall skewness of the market portfolio. Therefore since in the empirical work by Kraus and Litzenberger (1976) 18 Kraus and Litzenberger (1976) regress the excess returns on d
Harvey and Siddique (2000) construct a three-moment CAPM whose asset pricing equation is allowed to be time-varying (or "conditional" on the information available in each period), and find that the premium estimate for a time-varying equivalent of
) is always significant.
19 As is shown in (7), a negative coefficient for d
The key question of whether we can reasonably assume all portfolio changes are skewness-comparable is clearly an empirical one. If these changes are not all skewness-comparable, then the pricing equation (7) becomes an approximation: since an individual's utility depends not just on the first three moments but other characteristics of the return distributions, an asset's marginal effect on such an characteristic may have a systematic effect on its excess return and may thus compromise the empirical performance of a pricing equation like (7). Judging by the available test results, however, these potential compromising effects, if present, do not seem strong. See a related discussion in footnote 9.
The Incentive Effects of Tax Reforms
In considering the implications of his pioneering analysis of skewness preference, Tsiang (1972, p.370) suggests that "the effect of income tax on risk-taking should be examined not only with respect to its impacts on the mean and variance of investment returns after tax, but also with respect to its impacts on the skewness of net returns. A progressive income tax... could certainly have a greater adverse effect on the willingess to take risk than a proportional tax with perfect loss offset that leave the mean and variance after tax at the same levels." Does a progressive tax necessarily reduce the skewness of the net returns of a risky investment and hence have a greater adverse effect on the willingness to take risk than a proportional income tax?
More generally, since the 1980s, there has been a broad international trend towards the flattening of personal income tax structures. Does such a reform increase the skewness of the after-tax income distribution and as a result, other things being equal, enhance the incentive to make risky investments? Our basic results on skewness preference can be applied to give definitive answers to these questions, under a particular definition of a "more progressive tax" as follows. 20
Definition 6 A tax schedule t 1 (x) is more residual-concave than another t 2 (x) if r 1 (r
concave where for i = 1, 2, r i (x) ≡ x − t i (x) is the residual income function under tax schedule
That is, a tax schedule t 1 (x) is more progressive than another t 2 (x) in the sense of residual concavity if the residual income function [x − t 1 (x)] is a concave transformation of [x − t 2 (x)]. Under this definition, any graduated-rate tax is more residual-concave than any proportional tax and a tax schedule becoming less residual-concave more generally defines a particular kind of flattening of the tax schedule. For example, flattening a graduated-rate tax by reducing the top marginal tax rate or by abolishing the income band where the highest marginal tax rate applies leads to a less 20 I received valuable advice from Peter Lambert on the presentation of concepts and results related to tax progression.
residual concave tax schedule. 21 We next show that in most relevant cases in practice a more residual-concave tax schedule is a more progressive one as is usually defined in the literature on income inequality measurement (see Lambert (2001) 
for example).
Proposition 2 Suppose r 1 (r −1 2 (0)) ≥ 0. Then a tax schedule t 1 (x) has more residual progression than t 2 (x), i.e., [x − t 1 (x)]/[x − t 2 (x)] is non-increasing for all x, if t 1 (x) is more residual-concave than t 2 (x).
The condition r 1 (r −1
clearly satisfied if we only consider tax schedules involving no lump-sum elements, i.e., t i (0) = 0, in which case r 1 (r −1 2 (0)) = 0. Typical real-world tax schedules with a personal allowance, i.e., an amount subtracted from pre-tax income in arriving at taxable income, are clearly in this category.
Given Definition 6, Lemmas 2 and 3 immediately imply the following.
Proposition 3 For a given pre-tax income distribution, let F and G denote the after-tax income distributions under tax schedules t 1 (x) and t 2 (x) respectively. If t 1 (x) is more residual-concave than t 2 (x), then G is more skewed to the right than F and m G > m F .
For an interpretation of the result, suppose an investor's initial income is non-random and F and G represent the after-tax prospective income distributions given a risky investment under tax schedules t 1 (x) and t 2 (x) respectively. The result implies that if t 1 (x) is more residual-concave than t 2 (x), we can decompose the effect on the expected utility of the change of tax schedules from t 1 to t 2 as follows
21 This can be best illustrated considering a tax schedule t2(x), its residual income function and a concave function T (τ ) as follows.
Let a tax schedule t 1 (x) be such that x − t 1 (x) = T (x − t 2 (x)). Then the change from t 1 (x) to t 2 (x) is equivalent to reducing the top marginal tax rate ifτ =x and to abolishing the top rate income band ifτ >x. In the United Kingdom for example the top marginal tax rate was cut in 1979 and the top rate income band was abolished in 1988.
That is, not only does a tax flattening in the form of the change from t 1 to t 2 unequivocably increase the skewness of the prospective income distribution but how it affects the attractiveness of the investment is completely determined by its effect on the mean, variance, and third moment of the after-tax distribution. Furthermore, assuming skewness preference, such a tax reform increases the attractiveness of the investment compared with a "skewness-neutral" tax reform that achieves the same effects on the mean and the variance of the after-tax income distribution. More specifcially, noting the relationship between
clearly induces an after-tax income distribution equal to F 2 (x) (which has the same mean and variance as G(x)) and a tax reform from t 1 (x) to t 2 (x) clearly makes the investment more attractive compared with the reform from t 1 (x) to t 3 (x). Since any graduated-rate (i.e., convex) tax schedule is more residual-concave than a proportional tax as remarked earlier, a corollary of this is a formal validation of Tsiang's conjecture if a progressive tax is understood to be a graduated-rate tax: Any graduated-rate tax has a greater adverse effect on the attractiveness of a risky investment than a proportional tax with perfect loss offset that leaves the mean and variance after tax at the same levels. 22 Appendix A. Skewness Preference and the Prudence Measure Chiu (2005a) shows that assuming (i) F and G have equal means, (ii)
22 A completely analogous interpretation can be developed in terms of the impacts of tax reforms on income inequality and on a Social Welfare function or an inequality index, which exhibits "downside inequality aversion" or "transfer sensitivity". A useful and novel role of the third moment in the analysis of income inequality is also implied. The details are however left to readers well-versed in the related literature.
And the conditions (i), (ii), and (iii) together have the interpretation that the change from F to G is decomposable into a downside risk increase and an MPC "preceded" by the downside risk increase.
The prudence measure can thus be interpreted as measuring the strength of an individual's downside risk aversion relative to his own risk aversion. Since under our definition of skewness comparability, a downside risk increase is a "pure" decrease in skewness where the two distributions have the same mean and variance, the prudence measure can equivalently be said to measure the strength of skewness preference relative to risk aversion.
However, it can be easily shown that, under our definition of (generalized) skewness comparability, [F (x) → G(x)] satisfying conditions (i)-(iii) (and hence being decomposable into a downside risk increase and an MPC "preceded" by the downside risk increase) does not imply that F is more right skewed than G. Nor does F being more skewed to the right than G, together with
. Such implication does hold though in special cases. Under Van Zwet's stronger notion of skewness comparability, F being more right skewed than G (i.e., F −1 (G(x)) being convex), together with μ F = μ G , and
. Likewise, if F and G are Bernoulli distributions, then F being more right skewed than G (see Proposition 1), together with μ F = μ G , and σ 2 F > σ 2 G , also implies that [F (x) → G(x)] satisfies conditions (i)-(iii). 23 In these cases, the choice between the two distributions is determined by the relative strengths of skewness preference and risk aversion, which is characterized by the prudence measure.
B. Proofs
Proof of Lemma 2.
convex if and only ifF −1 (Ĝ(x)) is convex, which in turn implies and is implied by [
being convex.F can thus crossĜ at most twice. But μF = μĜ and σF = σĜ imply thatF cannot crossĜ less than twice.
(
. μF = μĜ and σF = σĜ are equivalent to 23 Notice that, assuming μ F = μ G and σ For the converse, we are to show that if F and G are not skewness comparable, then it is possible that (μ F , σ 2 F , m 3 F ) = (μ G , σ 2 G , m 3 G ) and F (x) 6 = G(x). Let F and G be such that μ F = μ G = μ, 
2
Proof of Lemma 3. (i) By Lemma 1, F being more skewed to the right than G implies m F > m G . Conversely, if F is not more skewed to the right than G, by skewness comparability,
which implies m 3 F ≤ m 3 G .
(ii) μ F = μ G ≡ μ, m 3 F = m 3 G , and skewness comparability imply that F (σ F x + μ) = G(σ G x + μ) or equivalently F (x) = G( 
Proof of Proposition 1. First we know
If p 1 = p 2 , then by (9)
which gives ( y 1 − μ 1 σ 1 ) 2 < (>)( y 2 − μ 2 σ 2 ) 2 and ( z 1 − μ 1 σ 1 ) 2 < (>)( z 2 − μ 2 σ 2 ) 2 and thus contradicts (10). That is, p 1 = p 2 implies (y 1 − μ 1 )/σ 1 = (y 2 − μ 2 )/σ 2 , which by (9) implies (z 1 − μ 1 )/σ 1 = (z 2 − μ 2 )/σ 2 and hence F 1 (σ 1 x + μ 1 ) = F 2 (σ 2 x + μ 2 ).
This completes the proof of both (i) and (ii) because what is shown also implies that if p 1 6 < p 2 , then F 2 (x) is not more skewed to the right than F 1 (x), and that if p 1 6 = p 2 , then F 1 (σ 1 x + μ 1 ) 6 = F 2 (σ 2 x + μ 2 ).
Proof of Proposition 2. Let T (τ ) ≡ r 1 (r −1 2 (τ )). Then t 1 (x) having more residual progression than t 2 (x) is equivalent to T (τ )/τ being non-increasing and t 1 (x) being more residual-concave than t 2 (x) is equivalent to T being concave. T (τ )/τ is non-increasing in τ if
But by the Mean-Value Theorem, for any τ > 0, there exists τ 1 ∈ [0, τ] such that
The concavity of T and T (0) ≥ 0 thus implies
That is, T (τ )/τ is non-increasing in τ .
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